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Abstract
In competitive situations, individuals need to adjust their behavioral strategy dynamically in
response to their opponent’s behavior. In the present study, we investigated the neural
basis of how individuals adjust their strategy during a simple, competitive game of matching
pennies. We used entropy as a behavioral index of randomness in decision-making, be-
cause maximizing randomness is thought to be an optimal strategy in the game, according
to game theory. While undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), subjects
played matching pennies with either a human or computer opponent in each block, although
in reality they played the game with the same computer algorithm under both conditions.
The winning rate of each block was also manipulated. Both the opponent (human or com-
puter), and the winning rate, independently affected subjects’ block-wise entropy during the
game. The fMRI results revealed that activity in the bilateral anterior insula was positively
correlated with subjects’ (not opponent’s) behavioral entropy during the game, which indi-
cates that during an interpersonal competitive game, the anterior insula tracked how uncer-
tain subjects’ behavior was, rather than how uncertain subjects felt their opponent's
behavior was. Our results suggest that intuitive or automatic processes based on somatic
markers may be a key to optimally adjusting behavioral strategies in competitive situations.
Introduction
In competitive interactions with another agent, individuals need to continuously adjust their
behavioral strategy in response to their opponent’s behavior. Dynamic adjustment of behavior
is crucial, particularly in an interpersonal competitive situation, as failure to do so results in ex-
ploitation by the opponent. The neural mechanisms underlying such dynamic behavioral ad-
justments have been previously investigated in single-cell recording studies in monkeys [1–4]
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as well as in neuroimaging studies on humans [5,6]. Here, we extend these studies, and investi-
gate the neural mechanisms of strategic behavioral adjustments during a competitive game
with human and computer opponents, using behavioral entropy as an index.
In this study, subjects performed a simple game of matching pennies (Fig 1) inside a func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) machine. We quantified the degree of randomness
in subjects’ decision-making throughout the game as “entropy,” which has been previously
proved to be a useful measure of randomness or uncertainty in a variety of decision-making
contexts [7–11]. According to game theory, maximizing randomness (i.e., entropy) while
choosing each response with equal probability is considered to be the optimal strategy during a
simple game such as matching pennies, because any systematic strategy could be exploited by
an opponent [12,13]. Thus, by using entropy as an index, we sought to shed light on the neural
mechanisms, which enable optimal adjustment of behavior in an interpersonal competitive
situation.
Subjects performed 20 trials of a matching pennies game in each block. We manipulated
two factors, both of which are expected to affect entropy; 1) the opponent in the game (human
or computer) and 2) the winning rate in each block. We had previously found that subjects’
top-down beliefs about the opponent (human vs. computer) affected behavioral entropy during
the game, and that entropy was higher when playing against a human as opposed to a comput-
er [10]. Furthermore, because individuals tend to follow a simple strategy, especially when win-
ning frequently (i.e., repeating the same choice after winning), we predicted that the more wins
subjects experience in a block, the smaller the degree of entropy would be.
As potential neural mechanisms for stochastic behaviors during an interpersonal competi-
tive game, we have two hypotheses, which are not mutually exclusive. In line with the idea of
the dual process model in psychology [14,15], increased randomness in decision-making may
rely on deliberative processes, and would recruit areas in the prefrontal cortex related to execu-
tive functions (e.g., working memory, inhibition of systematic responses), especially the dorso-
lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). Previous neuroimaging studies comparing a random
number generation (RNG) task with a control counting task showed that the generation of ran-
dom numbers activated the DLPFC [16,17]. Alternatively, increased entropy may be associated
with intuitive or automatic processes, and thus may recruit areas related to intuitive decision-
making, such as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), amygdala, and insula [18,19]. Of
these three regions, the insula seems to be the most important in behavioral adjustment in un-
certain situations. A previous study on brain lesion patients showed that the insula, but not the
vmPFC, is essential for risk adjustment [20]. Its activity is also known to be correlated with the
unpredictability of responses during Rock-Paper-Scissors game [5].
Materials and Methods
Subjects
A total of 23 healthy, right-handed subjects participated in the study. Our reported analyses are
based on 17 subjects (10 males; age range, 18–25 years). Data from four subjects were excluded
from analysis due to excessive head motion, and one subject was excluded due to a computer
malfunction during the task. One additional subject was excluded from the analysis because
after the experiment, she reported that she did not believe her opponent was a human player in
the human condition. None of the subjects had any history of neurological or psychiatric ill-
ness. All subjects provided written informed consent prior to participation in the study, and all
protocols were approved by the Ethics Committee of Tamagawa University, Japan.
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Task
Inside the fMRI scanner, subjects played a matching pennies game. This game is often cited in
game theory literature as the most simplified example of a zero-sum competitive situation. The
game is played between two players: a subject and another player (a human or computer oppo-
nent). In each trial, the two players select their decisions from two options. While the original
matching pennies game is played by turning the penny to heads or tails, in the present study,
we used a computer version of the game where subjects were asked to select their decision by
pressing one of two buttons (left or right). The win or loss of each player is determined by the
combination of decisions selected by the two players. If the players’ choices are the same, the
subject wins the game. If they do not match, the opponent wins. The winning player scores 100
points, and the losing player loses 100 points in every trial.
The opponent in the game was manipulated so that subjects were told that they were playing
20 matching pennies games in each block with either a human, or a computer partner in a
pseudo-randomized order. Subjects were led to believe that they were playing with a real
human partner in the human condition; however, in reality, they played against the same pre-
programmed computer algorithm under both conditions. Furthermore, as there was a brief
Fig 1. (a) Experimental task. In each block, subjects played 20 trials of a matching pennies game with what
they believed was either a human or computer opponent (subjects were informed of their opponent type at
the beginning of each block). In each trial (2 s), subjects were asked to choice one of two decision by pressing
a button (left or right) as soon as possible (within 1 s; decision period). After the decision period, an outcome
of a decision was presented as two allow directions (1s; outcome). The arrow on topside indicates subjects’
chose direction, and the arrow on the bottom side indicates the opponent’s chose direction. If the players’
choices are the same, the subject wins the game. If they do not match, the opponent wins. The winning player
scores 100 points, and the losing player loses 100 points in every trial. Total outcomes of both players were
visually presented as the box’s heights beside the opponent’s picture during playing the game (if a current
total outcome was positive for a subject, the box’s color was blue and if not, its color was red). After 20trials
game, the total points that a subject got (or lost) in the session was displayed for 2 s. (b) Left: an example
picture of displayed human opponents, Right: the displayed picture of computer opponent. These pictures
were always presented on the top side of the screen during the game.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0123329.g001
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delay between subjects’ response and the revelation of the game outcome in each trial (see Fig
1), the algorithm generated the opponent’s response after knowing the subjects’ response, and
the number of times subjects won in each block was manipulated based on pre-determined
probabilities (40%, 50%, or 60%). Within each block, the degree to which subjects adjusted
their behavioral strategy was quantified as entropy, and entropy was used as a parametric re-
gressor in the fMRI analysis in order to identify its neural correlates (see below).
Each trial of the matching pennies game lasted 2 s (see Fig 1). Subjects were required to
press one of two buttons within 1 s, and the game outcome was presented for 1 s. They used a
button box with their index and middle fingers to respond, and were instructed to select their
response as soon as possible. When subjects failed to respond within 1 s, a computer randomly
generated a response for that trial. Before each task block, a 16-s rest block was inserted. Each
task block started with a cue (2 s) indicating the opponent type (human or computer) with
whom subjects are going to play the game, and the number of points earned in each block was
displayed at the end of the block for 2 s (Fig 1). Each of the six possible conditions (the oppo-
nent type × the pre-determined winning probability: 40%, 50%, or 60%) was repeated eight
times across four fMRI runs (12 task blocks in each run; a total of 48 blocks).
Experimental procedure
Upon arriving at the fMRI scanner room, subjects were instructed in how to play the matching
pennies game and tasked with accumulating as many points as possible during the game in the
fMRI scanner. They were also told that in half of the game blocks, they would play against a
human opponent, while in the other half, they would play against a computer opponent. After
receiving the instructions, they briefly met a female research assistant (confederate) and were
told that they would be playing the game with her during the human condition. All subjects
performed a practice session (20 trials each for the human and computer condition) outside of
the fMRI room. During the practice session, subjects and the research assistant sat side by side,
and played the game using a laptop computer. A partition was placed between them so that
they could not see other’s hands during the practice session (in reality, the confederate choice
was made by the same computer algorithm used for the computer condition).
Immediately after the practice session, subjects entered the fMRI scanner room, and it was
explained that the research assistant would stay in the scanner control room and play the game
during the human condition. After all experimental blocks had been completed, subjects were
fully debriefed and asked whether they had any doubts about the opponent manipulation
(human or computer).
Behavioral analysis
One useful behavioral measure of how much an individual attempts to adjust their strategy
during a matching pennies game is “entropy.” Entropy is a measure of the degree of random-
ness or uncertainty in decision-making, and maximizing entropy is considered an optimal
strategy in the matching pennies game according to the game theory [12,13]. Entropy repre-
sents how difficult it is to predict subjects’ response from their pattern of responses in previous
trials. For example, if individuals played the game by following a simple rule such as a win-
stay/lose-switch rule, the level of entropy tends to be low, while entropy is at a maximum when
subjects’ behavior is completely random.
We quantified the randomness of decision-making during each block of 20 matching pen-
nies trials as entropy H, which was calculated using the conditional frequency p(d| c) of the de-
cision d (L or R) selected in the current game context c (the recent choices for participants and
opponents) [10,11]. Entropy H indicates how decision d is generated independently from the
The Anterior Insula Tracks Behavioral Entropy
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current game context, and the value of H positively correlates with the degree of randomness
of decision-making in the matching pennies game.
p(d| c) was calculated from the following equation:
pðdjcÞ ¼ nðdjcÞ þ kX
i
fnðijcÞ þ kg
A variable n(d| c) indicates the observed number of times a decision d is made in context c.
k is a correction coefﬁcient that prevents small samples from deforming p(d| c). Because work-
ing memory is limited, participants are unlikely to be able to access the entire context, but rath-
er, their decisions might be based on a portion of the context. We assumed six partial contexts
(pc) for the entropy estimation (S1; the last decision by the participant, S2; the last two deci-
sions by the participant, O1; the last decision by the opponent, O2; the last two decisions by
the opponent, S1&O1; a combination of the last decision by both the participant and the oppo-
nent, none; no game context) and cpc is the game context corresponding to each pc. Entropy
H(d| cpc) in each session was calculated using the following equation:
Hpc ¼ 
1
Npc
X
cpc
X
d
pðdjcpcÞlog2pðdjcpcÞ
Here, Npc is the number of possible alternatives for a particular cpc, and this variable normal-
izes Hpc in the range from 0 to 1. For each session, the lowest of the six entropy values was cho-
sen as the decision-entropy value for that session. This value increases towards a value of 1 as
decisions become less predictable.
fMRI data acquisition
Functional imaging was conducted using a 3 Tesla Siemens Trio A TimMRI scanner. For func-
tional imaging during the experimental sessions, interleaved T2-weighted gradient-echo
echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequences were used to produce 44 continuous 3-mm-thick trans-
axial slices covering nearly the entire cerebrum (repetition time [TR] = 3000 ms; echo time
[TE] = 25 ms; flip angle [FA] = 90°; field of view [FOV] = 192 mm2; 64 × 64 matrix; voxel di-
mensions = 3.0 × 3.0 × 3.0 mm). A high-resolution anatomical T1-weighted image was also ac-
quired for each subject.
fMRI data pre-processing
Before data processing and statistical analysis, we discarded the first 4 volumes to allow for
magnetization equilibration. Data were analyzed using Statistical Parametric Mapping 5
(SPM5, Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK) software implemented
in Matlab 7.8 (Mathworks, Sherborn, MA, USA). After correcting for differences in slice timing
within each image volume, head motion was corrected using the realignment program within
SPM5. Following realignment, the volumes were normalized to the Montreal Neurological In-
stitute (MNI) space using a transformation matrix, which was obtained from the normalization
process of the first EPI image of each individual subject to the EPI template. The normalized
fMRI images were resampled to 2 x 2 x 2 mm3 and spatially smoothed with an isotropic Gauss-
ian kernel of 8 mm (full-width at half-maximum).
The Anterior Insula Tracks Behavioral Entropy
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fMRI data analysis
We used four general linear models (GLM) to analyze the fMRI data. The first GLM was in-
tended to identify brain regions associated with behavioral entropy in each block, within a pri-
ori defined regions of interest (ROIs) (see below). We ran the second GLM for an exploratory
ROI-analysis that aimed to show a detailed activation pattern, especially in the anterior insula.
We ran the third and fourth GLMs in order to refute the possibility that the anterior insula acti-
vation patterns revealed by the first GLM were related to either negative emotions associated
with losing the game or uncertainty in the opponent’s behavior (i.e., opponent’s entropy),
respectively.
The first GLM included the following 8 regressors: 1) human blocks (44 s); 2) human blocks
modulated by the level of the subject’s entropy; 3) human blocks modulated by the opponent’s
entropy; 4) human blocks modulated by the actual winning rate; 5) computer blocks (44 s); 6)
computer blocks modulated by the level of entropy; 7) computer blocks modulated by the op-
ponent’s entropy; and 8) computer blocks modulated by the actual winning rate. The winning
rate indicates the number of points subjects have actually obtained (i.e., equivalent to the num-
ber of times they won) in each block. As is standard in SPM8, all parametric modulators were
orthogonalized with respect to all modulators that preceded them in the model.
To visually present the pattern of entropy-related activation, especially in the anterior
insula, we ran the second GLM. In this GLM, each block was categorized into one of three
groups depending on the degree of entropy (high, medium, or low), and the human and com-
puter conditions were addressed separately. Thus, the GLM included the following six regres-
sors: 1) human high-entropy blocks; 2) human medium-entropy blocks; 3) human low-
entropy blocks; 4) computer high-entropy blocks; 5) computer medium-entropy blocks; and 6)
computer low-entropy blocks.
In the third GLM, in order to illustrate whether or not anterior insula activity was associated
with losing the game (i.e., negative emotions, frustration), each block was categorized into one
of three groups, depending on the actual winning rate (high, medium, or low), separately for
the human and computer conditions. Thus, the GLM included the following 6 regressors: 1)
human high-win blocks; 2) human medium-win blocks; 3) human low-win blocks; 4) comput-
er high-win blocks; 5) computer medium-win blocks; and 6) computer low-win blocks.
Finally, in the fourth GLM, in order to test whether anterior insula activity was associated
with how uncertain subjects felt about their opponent’s behavior, each block was categorized
into one of three groups, depending on the opponent’s entropy (high, medium, or low), sepa-
rately for the human and computer conditions. Thus, the GLM included the following 6 regres-
sors: 1) human high-opponent entropy blocks; 2) human medium-opponent entropy blocks;
3) human low-opponent entropy blocks; 4) computer high-opponent entropy blocks; 5) com-
puter medium-opponent entropy blocks; and 6) computer low-opponent entropy blocks.
For all GLMs, the regressors were calculated using a box-car function convolved with a he-
modynamic-response function. Regressors that were of no interest, the session effect, and
high-pass filtering (128 s) were also included.
As stated above, we aimed to examine whether activities in areas related to deliberative pro-
cesses (i.e., DLPFC) and areas related to intuitive processes (i.e., vmPFC, amygdala, and insula)
are positively correlated with the level of subjects’ behavioral entropy. Furthermore, as has
been repeatedly reported in previous studies, we expected that the mentalizing networks, in-
cluding the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), temporoparietal junction (TPJ), superior tempo-
ral sulcus (STS), and precuneus, would show higher levels of activation in the human condition
as compared to the computer condition [21–25], and that activity in reward-related brain
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regions, namely the striatum (i.e., caudate nucleus and putamen), would be correlated with the
winning rate [26,27].
For these a priori ROIs, anatomical masks were generated using the WFU PickAtlas
toolbox for SPM [28] using the Automated Anatomical Labeling (AAL) atlas. Within the ROIs,
the statistical threshold was set at p< 0.005 (uncorrected) and cluster p< 0.05 (corrected for
multiple comparisons). Activations outside of the ROIs were reported if they exceeded the
threshold of p< 0.001 (uncorrected) and whole-brain cluster corrected p< 0.05.
Results
Behavioral results
Subjects successfully pressed one of two buttons most of the time during the experiment, and
rarely failed to respond (miss rate: human condition = 0.33%; computer condition = 0.38%).
There was no significant difference in the miss rate between the two conditions (t(16) = -0.40,
p = 0.70).
We examined how the two manipulations (opponent and winning rate) affected subjects’
behavioral entropy in each block, using a multiple linear regression. We included, as a regres-
sor, 1) the opponent of the game (dummy coded as human = 1 and computer = 0), 2) winning
rate (entered as the amount of money the subject earned in each block multiplied by -1), 3) en-
tropy of the opponent, and 4) interaction between the first and second factors. The entropy of
the opponent in each block was included in the analysis, to investigate whether the subject’s en-
tropy simply reflects how stochastic or uncertain the opponent was. Our results revealed that,
as predicted, there were significant effects of the opponent (mean standardized regression coef-
ficient (b) = 0.013, t(16) = 2.34, p = 0.016) and of the winning rate (b = 0.027, t(16) = -2.20,
p = 0.021), while the effect of opponent’s entropy or the interaction between the opponent and
the winning rate were not significant (p> 0.16, n.s.) (see Fig 2A), suggesting that the opponent
and the winning rate independently affected the subjects’ block-wise entropy. The effects of the
opponent and the winning rate did not differ from each other (t(16) = -1.43, p = 0.17, n.s.).
Fig 2. Behavioral results. (a) Results frommultiple regression analysis. Standardized beta coefficients
associated with behavioral entropy are depicted. The wining rate was entered into the regression analysis as
the amount of money the subjects earned in each block, multiplied by -1, so that the positive beta coefficients
indicate a negative association between the winning rate and entropy. (b) The level of behavioral entropy in
each condition (human or computer condition) as a function of the winning rate (high, medium, or low). Higher
entropy indicates that subjects’ responses were more random, while lower entropy indicates that their
responses were more systematic.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0123329.g002
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Essentially the same result was obtained when each block was categorized into 3 groups de-
pendent on the actual winning rate (the number of wins in each block; high, medium, or low)
(Fig 2B). A 2 (opponent: human or computer) × 3 (winning rate: low, medium, or high) repeat-
ed-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA), with behavioral entropy as a dependent variable,
revealed both significant main effects of the game opponent (F(1,16) = 4.62, p = 0.047) as well as
of the winning ratio (F(1,16) = 5.60, p = 0.008), but no interaction between the factors (F(2,32) =
0.03, p = 0.97) (Fig 2B). Thus, results from both analyses indicate that subjects’ entropy was
higher when they believed they were playing the game against a human partner as compared to
against a computer; moreover, the more losses subjects experienced in each block, the higher
the degree of entropy.
We confirmed that there was no significant difference between male and female subjects in
all behavioral results.
fMRI results
Before investigating the neural correlates of entropy, we first contrasted all of the human condi-
tions with all of the computer conditions. Expected mentalizing related regions are too broad.
Hence we showed all brain activities without ROI analyses for display purpose. Consistent with
previous neuroimaging studies [21–25], we found significant activation in the mentalizing net-
work, including the mPFC, bilateral TPJ, right STS, and precuneus (Fig 3). All other activated
regions are listed in Table 1. It should be noted, however, that it is completely possible that
these regions activated by the human vs. computer conditions reflects simple face perception
processes rather than mentalizing.
We further investigated the brain areas positively correlated with the winning rate regard-
less of the game opponent. Not surprisingly, this analysis revealed that activations in reward-
related regions, including the caudate nucleus, putamen, and midbrain, were significantly cor-
related with the actual wining rate in each block (Fig 4 & Table 2). However, vmPFC and ven-
tral striatum showed no significant activation. Outside the ROIs, the winning rate was
positively correlated with activity in the cerebellum (a cluster extended from the midbrain).
There was no area that was negatively correlated with the winning rate.
Finally, the neural correlates of entropy were investigated using each subject’s block-wise en-
tropy as a parametric regressor (the first GLM). Areas that positively correlated with the degree
of entropy, regardless of the opponent (i.e., two conditions were pooled), were explored. As ex-
pected, significant activations were found in the bilateral anterior insula (Fig 5A & Table 3), indi-
cating that the larger the entropy in each block, the higher the level of activation in the anterior
Fig 3. Activated brain areas revealed by the humanminus computer contrast in the first GLM.
Consistent with previous studies, activations were found in the mentalizing networks, including the mPFC,
bilateral TPJ, right STS, and precuneus. For display purposes, the statistical threshold was set at p < 0.001
(uncorrected) and cluster p < 0.05 (corrected) with no anatomical mask.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0123329.g003
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insula. There were no significant activations within other a priori ROIs, including the DLPFC,
vmPFC, and amygdala. Outside the ROI, no area was significantly correlated with entropy, and
there was no area whose activity was negatively correlated with entropy. Since we found signifi-
cant entropy-related activations only in the bilateral anterior insula, we focused only on the ante-
rior insula in the following analysis. The exploratory ROI analysis with the second GLM
confirmed the predicted pattern of activity in the left anterior insula (the peak voxel correlated
with block-wise entropy in the first GLM). A 2 (opponent: human or computer) × 3 (level of en-
tropy: high, medium, or low) repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of
the opponent (F(1,16) = 6.30, p = 0.023), and of the level of entropy (F(1,16) = 5.78, p = 0.007), but
Table 1. Brain areas activated by the human vs. computer contrast.
Location BA MNI coordinate Z Cluster
x y z Size
Right Cerebellum - 26 -76 -26 5.78 6925
Left Cerebellum - -20 -80 -28 5.42
MPFC 9/10/32 10 50 38 5.41 10613
Left aINS 13/47 -32 18 -10 4.11
Dorsal MPFC 8 -2 28 56 4.43
Thalamus - -12 -6 4 3.98
Left caudate - -18 14 16 3.98
Right caudate - 18 12 16 4.25
Right DLPFC 8 38 26 38 4.75
PCC 23/31 0 -58 42 4.95 830
Left DLPFC 8 -40 20 42 4.55 1138
Right STS 21 64 -24 -6 4.40 355
Right OFC/aINS 13/47 42 26 -16 4.02 346
Left TPJ 39 -46 -56 22 4.00 725
Right TPJ 39 50 -64 26 3.92 227
BA, Brodmann area; MPFC, medial prefrontal cortex; aINS, anterior insula; DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; PCC, posterior cingulate cortex; STS,
superior temporal sulcus; OFC, orbitofrontal cortex; TPJ, temporoparietal junction.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0123329.t001
Fig 4. Areas in the striatum andmidbrain positively correlated with the winning rate (obtained from
the parametric analyses in the first GLM). Activities in the striatum (Left; caudate nucleus and putamen)
and midbrain (Right) were significantly correlated with the winning rate in each block. Within the striatal ROIs,
the statistical threshold was set at p < 0.005 (uncorrected) and cluster p < 0.05 (corrected).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0123329.g004
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no significant interaction between them (F(2,32) = 0.032, p = 0.968) (Fig 5B). The similar tenden-
cy can also be observed in right insula, however this tendency is not statistically significant.
ANOVA revealed no significant main effects of the opponent (F(1,16) = 4.16, p = 0.058) and the
level of entropy (F(1,16) = 1.78, p = 0.287) and no significant interaction between them (F(2,32) =
0.92, p = 0.410). Detail raw data are available on supporting information (S1 Data).
We also tested whether the same anterior insula region is related to the number of losses ex-
perienced in each block. Using the third GLM where each block was categorized according to
the winning rate (high, medium, or low), beta values were extracted from the peak in the left
anterior insula (coordinate x = -40, y = 14, z = 4), and a 2 (opponent: human or computer) × 3
(winning rate: high, medium, or low) repeated-measures ANOVA revealed only a significant
main effect of the opponent (F(1,16) = 5.97, p = 0.026). Importantly, there was no main effect of
winning rate (F(1,16) = 0.86, p = 0.43, n.s.), and neither was there a significant interaction be-
tween the variables (F(2,32) = 2.75, p = 0.08, n.s.). Similarly, we also tested whether the anterior
insula is related to how uncertain the opponent’s behavior was (i.e., opponent’s entropy). Each
block was categorized according to the opponent’s entropy (high, medium, or low) in the
fourth GLM, and a 2 (opponent: human or computer) × 3 (opponent’s entropy: high, medium,
or low) repeated-measures ANOVA revealed only a significant main effect of the opponent in
the left anterior insula (F(1,16) = 5.19, p = 0.037). Neither the main effect of the opponent’s en-
tropy (F(1,16) = 1.64, p = 0.21, n.s.), nor the interaction was significant (F(2,32) = 1.12, p = 0.34,
n.s.), being consistent to the behavioral results. Taken together, these results indicate that the
anterior insula activation found in the present study is unlikely to be explained by any negative
emotion associated with losing a game, or by uncertainty of the opponent’s strategy.
To further investigate whether entropy under the human and computer conditions had any
differential influence on activities in the anterior insula, we extracted beta values from a peak
voxel of each of the bilateral insula regions, and compared them between the human and com-
puter conditions. The results revealed no significant difference in either the right or left insula
(right insula: t(16) = 0.91, p = 0.38, left insula: t(16) = 0.80, p = 0.44). Furthermore, when the
parametric effect of entropy was contrasted across the whole brain between the human minus
computer conditions, we found no significant activation. No activation was found in the re-
verse contrast (entropy in the computer minus human conditions). These results suggest that
entropy was represented in the same regions (i.e., bilateral anterior insula), regardless of sub-
jects’ top-down belief that they are playing against a human or a computer partner.
We confirmed that there was no significant difference between male and female subjects in
all fMRI results.
Discussion
We investigated the neural basis of how well individuals adjust their behavior in a competitive
game, using entropy as an index of randomness in decision-making. Our behavioral results
Table 2. Brain areas positively correlated with the actual winning rate.
Location MNI coordinate Z Cluster
x y z Size
Right putamen 12 0 -10 4.56 1160
Left putamen -16 4 -8 3.33
Right caudate 12 16 6 3.34
Left caudate -12 14 12 2.95
Midbrain -4 -20 -18 3.68 739
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0123329.t002
The Anterior Insula Tracks Behavioral Entropy
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0123329 June 3, 2015 10 / 16
revealed that our two manipulations, of the opponent of the game (human vs. computer), and
the winning rate, independently affected subjects’ entropy. Replicating our previous study [10],
we found that entropy was significantly higher when subjects believed that they were playing
against a human partner as compared to a computer partner, despite the fact that they were ac-
tually playing the game against exactly the same computer algorithm. Entropy was also affected
by the number of wins subjects experienced in each block. As winning typically suggests that
they are doing well, subjects’ behavior becomes more systematic (i.e., a smaller level of entropy)
when their winning rate is higher. Our fMRI data revealed that the level of entropy in each
block was positively correlated with activity in the bilateral anterior insula.
A previous behavioral study showed that while humans are unable to produce random se-
quences of discrete responses, they could do so more successfully when the task was framed as
a strictly competitive situation, such as a matching pennies game [29]. Our present study, to-
gether with our previous investigation [10] extended this work and showed that in a competi-
tive situation, how well individuals can generate random responses is further influenced by
whether subjects believe that they are playing the game with a human or a computer, as well as
how often they win the game. The influence of subjects’ top-down belief about the nature of
the game opponent on entropy is especially interesting, and it may reflect how subjects auto-
matically attribute a mental state to a human opponent, and think that another human is capa-
ble of high-level strategic reasoning (i.e., she thinks that I think that she thinks. . .).
Consistent with this view, our previous study showed that not only the simple distinction
between human and computer opponents, but individual's impressions toward opponents or
Fig 5. (a) Bilateral anterior insula activity positively correlated with behavioral entropy (obtained from
the parametric analyses in the first GLM).Within the insula ROIs, the statistical threshold was set at
p < 0.005 (uncorrected) and cluster p < 0.05 (corrected). (b) The mean of the left anterior insula activities
(beta-values) obtained from the second GLM by each entropy degree and opponent. Beta-values were
extracted from the peak voxel identified by the first GLM.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0123329.g005
Table 3. Brain areas positively correlated with behavioral entropy.
Location BA MNI coordinate Z Cluster
x y z Size
Right aINS 13/22 44 20 0 3.37 274
Left aINS 13 -40 14 4 4.16 361
BA, Brodmann area; aINS, anterior insula
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0123329.t003
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“mind readerness” (the degree to which an individual characterizes opponents as being intelli-
gent and capable of mind-reading) have considerable influence on the behavioral entropy in
competitive games [11]. We further found that individuals' impressions of opponents modulat-
ed the neural activities in mentalizing related neural activitie [11]. How top-down information
such as subjects' impression of opponents modulates the neural activity of the anterior insula
during an interpersonal game therefore emerges as an interesting question for future research.
The present study demonstrated that during an interpersonal competitive game, increased
randomness as measured by entropy is associated with activity in the bilateral anterior insula
suggesting that intuitive processes plays an important role in optimally adjusting behavior. The
present findings are consistent with two previous studies [5,9]. Paulus and colleagues quanti-
fied response predictability during a Rock-Paper-Scissors game as “mutual information,” and
found that across subjects, the lower the response predictability during the game, the higher
levels of right insula activation [5]. Similarly, Ohira and his colleagues [9] conducted a positron
emission tomography (PET) study using a stochastic reversal learning task and showed that
across subjects, the activity of right anterior insula is significantly associated with entropy. Our
present study extends these findings, and shows that the anterior insula tracks within-subject,
rather than across-subject, variability in response predictability (i.e., entropy), thus providing
stronger evidence that the anterior insula is associated with making subject behavior more
unpredictable.
Can the activation of the anterior insula be explained simply by negative emotions associat-
ed with losing the game, or frustration associated with uncertainty of the opponent’s decision
(i.e., opponent’s entropy)? Although the insula is often reported to be involved in the experi-
ence of negative emotions such as sadness, disgust, and anger [30–32], our fMRI data showed
that entropy-related anterior insula activity was not modulated by the winning rate, which in-
dicates that the negative emotions associated with losses are unlikely to account for the anterior
insula activity found in the present study.
Furthermore, an important difference between the present study, and previous studies re-
porting the insula’s involvement in uncertainty in decision-making [33–36] should be noted.
In the present study, how uncertain subjects felt during the game would depend on how unpre-
dictable the opponent’s behavior was (i.e., opponent’s entropy). However, our behavioral data
showed that subjects’ own entropy was unrelated to their opponent’s entropy, suggesting that
the anterior insula activity was unrelated to how uncertain the opponent’s behavior was in
each block. Rather, our results suggest that in an interpersonal competitive situation, anterior
insula activity is related to how uncertain subjects’ behavior appeared to the opponent. One po-
tentially important difference seems to be the interactive nature of our task, where subjects had
to compete with another agent, while previous studies have generally used non-interactive
games such as a simple card-guessing game [33–36]. During an interactive competitive game,
individuals not only try to read the opponent’s behavior, but also have to actively avoid being
read by the opponent (try to be unpredictable to the opponent), while in non-interactive
games, there is no need to worry about being read by an opponent.
We believe that the most likely interpretation of anterior insula activation in the present
study is that increasing behavioral entropy relies on somatic markers, or gut feelings [19,37].
The anterior insula in particular is thought to play a key role in the interoceptive awareness of
feelings from the body [38,39]. Previous studies suggested that neurons in the prefrontal cortex
during a competitive game are involved in the process of updating the value function, which is
estimated by a reinforcement learning algorism [2,4,40]. Because a reinforcement learning
algorism tends to make animal’s behavior more systematic (i.e., win-stay-lost-switch strategy)
[41], insula might play a role in reducing the association between the updated value function
and subsequent behavior. Thus, automatic emotional processes based on somatic markers
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might play a key role in making subject’s behavior random by disconnecting actions from a
simple model-free reinforcement learning algorism. Furthermore, although increased random-
ness of response is associated with higher entropy, no insula activation has been reported in
past neuroimaging studies using the RNG task [16,17], suggesting that the insula is not in-
volved in generating random sequences of responses per se. As suggested by the results of a
study by [29], it may be the case that a strictly competitive game is a situation in which gut feel-
ing plays a particularly important role in determining behaviors, and automatic behavioral ad-
justments occur in response to the somatic marker (which is represented in the anterior
insula); this may be the key to successfully generating random sequences of responses in inter-
personal competitive games. However, what exactly anterior insula activation represents dur-
ing an interpersonal competitive game should be investigated in future research, for example,
by using physiological measures such as skin conductance response (SCR) and detailed emo-
tional ratings during the task.
While the neural system underlying intuitive processes (including somatic markers) in-
cludes the vmPFC and amygdala, as well as the insula [18,42], we observed only bilateral ante-
rior insula activations reflecting the degree of behavioral entropy. However, a functional
dissociation between the insula and vmPFC has been suggested in a study of patients with le-
sions to the insula and vmPFC, and the insula is considered to play an important role particu-
larly in risk adjustment [20]. While the insula lesion patients failed to adjust their bets based on
the odds of winning during the Cambridge Gamble Task, patients with lesions to the vmPFC
showed an increased level of betting regardless of the odds, but otherwise showed normal levels
of betting adjustment in accordance with changing odds [20].
In conclusion, we found that the manipulation of the game opponent and of the winning
rate independently affected entropy during a simple competitive game, and that activity in the
bilateral anterior insula tracked the state-level change in subjects’ behavioral entropy, suggest-
ing that increasing randomness and optimizing behaviors in a competitive situation relies
more on intuitive processes rather than on deliberate processes. Our findings also suggest that
behavioral entropy is a valid measure of how well subjects adjust their behavior during an in-
terpersonal game, and thus could potentially be used as a tool to identify differences in neural
processes between normal individuals and patients with neurological conditions in interper-
sonal situations. An interesting topic for future research may be testing behavioral entropy in
patients with autism. Allman and his colleagues [43] proposed the idea that abnormal develop-
ment of the von Economo neurons, a subset of neurons in the anterior cingulate and fronto-in-
sular cortex, may be responsible for some of the social difficulties experienced in autism. A
recent review [44] also suggested that hypoactivity in autism is related to the anterior insula,
and that dysfunctional anterior insula connectivity may be involved in many aspects of autistic
symptoms. Although children with and without autism showed no differences in their behav-
iors during interpersonal games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma game [45,46], differences
might be more easily identified using entropy as a behavioral measure. As people with autism
are known to be less sensitive to social context [47], their level of entropy during the game
might be predicted to be less affected by the manipulation of the opponent (human vs.
computer).
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